Arguing in an Objection-Reply Style

Doing philosophy is a lot like—scratch that, very much is—taking your favorite philosophical nemeses to coffee and hashing things out over a long afternoon. When we engage with philosophers, we argue with them as equals, often in a long conversation.

What does free will consist in? In response to Harry Frankfurt’s (1969) argument that the ability to do otherwise is not required for our freedom, an impressive line of critics (van Inwagen 1983; Naylor 1984; O’Connor 2000; Speak 2002; Capes and Swenson 2017; Robinson 2012, 2014, 2019) has tried to show that at least some residual alternative possibilities—“flickers of freedom”—nonetheless remain in Frankfurt-style cases. The leading comeback from Frankfurt’s friends, typically credited to John Martin Fischer (1994), is that these flickers of freedom, being flickers, are nowhere near robust enough to ground anybody’s freedom. Critics then cry foul: who said anything about a robustness requirement (see, e.g., Robinson 2019, 191)?

I’d like to defend robustness. I argue that the critics are already committed to the robustness requirement on their own terms because robustness is required rather than preempted by their insistence that Frankfurt-style cases be construed as ordinary counterexamples.

Notice quite a few distinguishing features of this style of writing:

• The author is not neutral; the first-personal “I” is not only appropriate but expected in philosophical writing.
• The author not only takes a stand but makes a critical yet constructive move and pushes the conversation forward.
• And it is indeed a conversation with a structured, progressive “train of thought.”
• This step-by-step dialectical structure foregrounds the reasons why one philosopher disagrees with another, not the mere fact that there are points of disagreement.

It’s also easy to anticipate how the main parts of paper would be organized:

1. A stage-setting, expository section breaking down Frankfurt’s argument, the flicker of freedom defense, and the robustness comeback;
2. Another expository section presenting the flicker theorists’ objection to robustness; and
3. An argumentative section offering the author’s reply to the flicker theorists’ objection, including consideration of plausible further objections/complications.

We often tell students that we are not asking for mere summaries of materials we’ve read but want to hear students’ own voices and reflections. What we mean is that sec. 3 should be the star of the show, not one paragraph trailing in the end like an afterthought; it should take up at least its third of the space, if not over half.

The flip side of the problem is when students forget sec. 1 or rush sec. 2. This is why we encourage students to imagine that they are writing to a friend who has not taken a philosophy class, who needs them to slow down, contextualize, explain their terms, and make explicit their assumptions and inferences.

⛄ Attacking a strawman is no fun

One of the most compelling ways to defend an argument you find appealing is to show that the strongest objection to it fails. Likewise, one of the most compelling ways to critique an argument you have problems with is to focus on your strongest objection so you have the space to develop it and defend it against the strongest plausible reply.

✋ A non-exclusive library of objections

• Cast doubt on the truth of the evidence/premises cited in support of the conclusion (e.g., “Kant’s project begins with the idea that moral laws can be grounded in rational agency; I argue that this is not in fact possible”);
• Suggest that the conclusion would not follow even if all of the evidence/premises were true (so the reasoning commits some kind of fallacy);
• Introduce countervailing considerations, alternative positions, or further complications not yet taken into account;
• Uncover and challenge an unstated assumption;
• Exploit some internal inconsistency or tension;
• Zoom out to litigate the relative strength of competing views on the big picture level;
• Problematize how the question at issue is framed (e.g., “No, personal issues are political issues”);
• Draw out an implausible implication of the conclusion defended (i.e., reductio ad absurdum);
• And there’s so much more you could do!

References

Capes, Justin A., and Philip Swenson. 2017. “Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited.” Philosophical Studies 173:967–81.

Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy 66 (23): 829–39.

van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon.

Naylor, Margery Bedford. 1984. “Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.” Philosophical Studies 46:249–58.

O’Connor, Timothy. 2000. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.

Robinson, Michael. 2012. “Modified Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples and Flickers of Freedom.” Philosophical Studies 157 (2): 177–94.

———. 2014. “The Limits of Limited-Blockage Frankfurt-Style Cases.” Philosophical Studies 169:429–46.

———. 2019. “Robust Flickers of Freedom.” Social Philosophy & Policy 36 (1): 211–33.

Speak, Daniel. 2002. “Fanning the Flickers of Freedom.” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1): 91–105.